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MOSCOW--LIMITED COMMENT: LITTLE NEW: To date, Radio Moscow's broadcasts about the first CFM sessions have been devoted primarily to extensive and widely distributed reports of Vishinsky's statements.* The remarks of Acheson, Bevin, and Schuman have also been reported--but less extensively, and sometimes in a slanted fashion. The few Soviet commentaries about the Conference add little to the substance of Vishinsky's proposals and arguments. As was the case during the London Conference, the Soviet delegation is credited with responsibility for the prompt agreement on questions of procedure--and for the "pleasant atmosphere."** Despite the "auspicious beginning," however, occasional references to Western-inspired "difficulties" continue to appear--to the Bonn Constitution, for example; to the Berlin railway strike, which is interpreted as a "provocative" incident encouraged by the Western occupation authorities and timed to coincide with the CFM Conference; and to "reports" that "this time too" the U.S. would attempt a "Diktat" policy. And TASS, reporting Acheson's "disappointment" over Vishinsky's initial proposals, says that "Acheson thus let it be clearly understood that the U.S. has no intention of eliminating the consequences of the splitting activities in Western Germany, but, on the contrary, claims to extend the regime it established there to all of Germany."

* This tendency to present the Soviet viewpoint primarily via the words of the chief Soviet delegate, rather than by commentaries of its own, has also been characteristic of the Soviet radio during the initial stages of previous international conferences.

** It is worth noting, however, that in other contexts there has been no apparent let-up in the scope or degree of the Soviet radio's propaganda campaign against the "warmongering" Western forces of "aggression and imperialism"--which are identified in turn with American foreign policy.

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But the most recent available Soviet commentary, an IZVESTIA article about the 25 May session, uses such relatively mild language as: Acheson "came out against the proposals submitted by (Vishinsky) and made it quite clear that the U.S. delegation held to its former position"; Schuman put forth a "vague proposition"; and Bevin made a "very contradictory statement. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, as of this date at least, the Soviet radio has not resorted to the charge that Western propaganda, anticipating Conference failure, is setting the stage for attributing blame to the Soviet delegation. This is in marked contrast to the Soviet propaganda line developed immediately prior to the London Conference; at that time it was implied that the Western Powers were intent on scuttling the Conference and that therefore American propaganda was preparing "to blame the Soviet Union from the outset for failures of the Conference, to represent the Soviet Union as chiefly responsible for a policy of delaying and preventing joint decision."

SOVIET-CONTROLLED GERMANY--THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND THE CFM: Soviet-controlled German radios continue to plug the theme of "German unity," as does Moscow. Some of them also hold out qualified hopes that as a result of the sincere and righteous Soviet efforts the CFM Conference may prove successful. "We must not be disheartened," says one commentator. "The fact that full agreement has not been reached within the first three days need be no cause for pessimism."

The most startling contributions of Soviet-Zone broadcasts about the Conference, however, are the explicit and pointed references to the alleged significance of Shanghai's fall. Berlin commentator, Herbert Gessner, recalling Mao Tze-tung's declared readiness for peace two years ago, says:

"Now that Chiang Kai-shek and his American backers have learned the consequences of interpreting as weakness the constant readiness for peace on the part of the progressive forces, it may perhaps teach some other politicians of similar inclinations to assess more realistically the chances of success for their policies--also in Europe."

Contending that the world balance of forces has again shifted in favor of the "progressive camp," Gessner concludes that a point has been reached which conforms with Stalin's idea that it is perfectly possible for such different systems as capitalism and socialism to live peaceably side by side for a long time to come.

"The development in China will therefore undoubtedly have a great influence on the progress of the negotiations in Paris. ... It now depends on Anglo-U.S. diplomacy whether they will really learn this great lesson from the China example and apply it at the Paris Conference."

The commentator also derides Acheson's rejection of the proposal to discuss the Japanese

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peace treaty at Paris; the rejection is attributed to American displeasure over the prospect of having to discuss it with the USSR and "New China" on one side and the U.S. and Britain on the other. Another Soviet-Zone German commentator, Leipzig's Zoeger, interprets the fall of Shanghai as proof that the liberation of peoples suppressed by the imperialist powers cannot be halted by financial enslavement or the power of high finance; "those of the Conference partners at Paris today who are concerned by this should draw their own conclusions."

SATELLITE RADIO--ECHOES OF MOSCOW: Following Moscow's lead, most of the Satellite radios report fully on Vishinsky's statements and give considerably less attention to the statements of the other Foreign Ministers. There are occasional references to Western-inspired "difficulties," as well as occasional expressions of "cautious optimism" about the Conference outcome. Otherwise, little independent comment has appeared.

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